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In this thesis, the relationship between the characteristics or attributes of a 
military weapon system (e.g., speed, reliability, survivability) and the effectiveness 
ofthat system is thoroughly examined. Success in system acquisition relies on (1) 
the early identification and successful incorporation of those system attributes that are 
critical to system effectiveness, and (2) the specification of numerical values for the 
system attributes (the system requirements) that maximizes system effectiveness at 
an acceptable cost. New definitions for system, system attributes, and system 
effectiveness, as well as relevant DoDI 5000.2 guidance are provided. In addition to 
the currently-mandated battle level at which system effectiveness should be measured 
(in terms of engagement or battle outcomes), the author uses a wide spectrum of 
system acquisition-related literature to advocate that system effectiveness should also 
be measured at the mission level (in terms of mission outcome). Several existing 
mathematical models which combine a few key system attribute measurements into 
single-number measures of system effectiveness in accomplishing a particular mission 
are described. Then, the author proposes a hierarchy or tree which relates many 
system attributes to the four key attributes, Availability, Reliability, Survivability, and 
Capability, and hence to system effectiveness in accomplishing a specified mission. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the 
characteristics or attributes of a military weapon system and the effectiveness of the 
system. System effectiveness is widely viewed as the result of the complex 
interaction of a multitude of system attributes, such as lethality, reliability, 
survivability, and maintainability. The only given official guidance for weapon 
system acquisition regarding system effectiveness measurement is that the measures 
of effectiveness (MOEs) should measure operational capabilities in terms of 
engagement or battle outcomes. Because the official guidance does not provide a 
standard model for system effectiveness measurement, several models have been 
offered which reduce the measurement of system effectiveness to an equation 
involving the combination of a few key attribute measurements, or performance 
parameters. 
In this thesis, the author will propose a mission level for measuring system 
effectiveness, in addition to the battle level. Based on this alternative level, and a 
review of several existing system effectiveness models, the author will propose a 
hierarchy of system attributes which may affect overall system effectiveness in 
accomplishing a specified mission. Ultimately, this thesis should provide the reader 
with a better understanding of the relationship between system attributes and system 
effectiveness. 
B. APPROACH 
The author will accomplish the purpose described above through the following 
chapters. First, in Chapter II, a few key definitions and issues will be addressed. In 
Chapter III, the current system effectiveness measurement process, as defined in the 
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official U.S. Code and DoD guidance, will be presented. In Chapter IV, a mission 
level for measuring system effectiveness will be proposed which allows a linkage 
between system attributes and system effectiveness. In Chapter V, the relationship 
between system attributes and system effectiveness in the system design/test and 
evaluation processes will be examined. In Chapter VI, the quantification of system 
effectiveness will be examined, and two general methods of combining key system 
attributes into single-number system effectiveness measurements will be presented, 
along with several representative models. Last1.7 in Chapter VII, the author will 
propose a hierarchy or tree of system attributes which may affect overall system 
effectiveness in accomplishing a specified mission. 
C.       SCOPE 
This thesis is limited to the standard U.S. acquisition process for weapons 
systems which requires all of the DoD 5000-mandated documentation. It will not 
consider recent relaxations in documentation requirements for some minor systems. 
Because the DoD 5000 documents are currently being revised, those draft revisions 
that are pertinent to this thesis are included. As a further limitation, the included 
models and systems are only samples of a model population that cannot be fully 
included in one report. Therefore, there are undoubtedly some aspects of system 
effectiveness measurement which will not be covered. This thesis will, however, 
attempt to address many key areas which are applicable to the subject matter. 
II. SYSTEMS, ATTRIBUTES, AND EFFECTIVENESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the author will provide some preliminary information and 
definitions as a foundation for the follow-on examination of system effectiveness 
concepts and measurements. First, some basic definitions for "system" and "system 
attributes" will be provided. Next, the author will preview the examination of system 
effectiveness by presenting a list of the key issues which will be addressed in this 
thesis. 
B. KEY DEFINITIONS 
1.        System 
A specific definition of what constitutes a system has yet to be universally 
accepted. Several different definitions of systems can be found in the system 
effectiveness-related literature. Three examples are: 
A set of interacting components composed of humans and machines 
(including software) directed toward performing a function or number 
of functions and operating within the constraints of time and specified 
environments.   [Ref. 1 :p. 6] 
A number of parts which are connected together in order to transform 
a given set of inputs into a given set of outputs. [Ref. l:p. 81] 
A set of interrelated components which interact with one another in an 
organized fashion toward a common purpose. [Ref. 2:p. 3] 
This thesis will focus on military weapon systems, which are defined by the 
author using a variation of the first definition given in this section: 
"A set of interacting components composed of humans and machines 
assembled for the purpose of one or more military missions and operating within the 
constraints of time and specified environments." 
2.        System Attributes 
As there is no universally-accepted definition for a system, there is also no 
universally-accepted term used to describe the attributes of a system. In this report, 
the author will combine the most commonly-used terms into the following definition 
for system attributes: "The characteristics, capabilities, or parameters of a system." 
Examples of some possible system attributes are shown in Table 2.1. 
Speed Survivability Availability 
Range Susceptibility Maintainability 
Payload Vulnerability Logistic Supportability 
Weight Compatability Manpower Supportability 
Diameter Human Factors Transportability 
Maneuverability Safety Reliability 
Lethality Interoperability Natural Environmental 
Effects/Impacts 
Table 2.1. Some Possible System Attributes 
Note that many of the attributes listed in Table 2.1 can easily be quantified at 
the beginning of a system acquisition program using well established metrics. For 
example, the attributes of speed, range, and payload can have the metrics of kilo- 
meters/hour, kilometers, and kilograms, respectively. These quantifiable attributes 
of the developing or developed system can also be tested and evaluated relatively 
easily because they are essentially deterministic in nature; that is, a relatively small 
number of non-destructive tests is sufficient to obtain an estimate of their value. 
Other attributes, such as reliability, safety, and survivability, are more difficult 
to quantify at the beginning of system acquisition because of their random nature. For 
these attributes, probability measures, such as mean time between failures, probability 
of a mishap in 100,000 flight hours, and probability of mission survival, could be used 
as the defining metric. The testing required to determine these attributes is also more 
difficult because of the relatively large number of tests required to obtain an accurate 
estimate of their value. In addition, the system testing may be complicated by the 
destructive nature of the attribute in the event of failure, as in the case of safety and 
survivability. 
A third type of attribute, such as interoperability and compatability, can not be 
quantified. These attributes are of a "yes or no" nature; either the system is 
interoperable or compatible with another system in one aspect or another, or it is not. 
However, even with these attributes, there may be other attributes that, when 
quantified, will result in a positive yes. For example, a radio being developed may 
be compatible with an existing radio if the frequency bands, which are quantifiable, 
are the same. 
The crux of a successful system acquisition program is (1) early identification 
and successful incorporation of those attributes that are critical to system 
effectiveness and (2) the specification of numerical values for the system attributes 
(the system requirements) that maximizes system effectiveness at an acceptable cost. 
3.        Summary 
Usage of the term, "attribute", in this report is a conscious attempt at 
uniformity. In the official DoD guidance (excerpts of which will be included in the 
next chapter), a variety of different terms are used to signify system attributes. These 
terms are "characteristic," "capability" and "parameter," and they are usually preceded 
by the term "performance". Intermingled use of these different terms tends to 
complicate system-related discussion. In contrast to the official guidance, this report 
will replace these various terms with a single, overarching term, "attribute". This 
consistency should facilitate the reader's understanding of the subject matter. 
C       SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS - KEY ISSUES 
1. System Effectiveness - A Complex Topic 
In the system acquisition process, the effectiveness and the cost of a system are 
the two key ingredients in determining overall system value to the military services. 
Of these two key ingredients, system effectiveness is the one most difficult to define, 
explain, and measure. For instance, while system cost may be defined in terms of 
dollars, system effectiveness has no such standard basis for definition. Due to its 
inherent complexity, the topic of system effectiveness has received wide attention, 
and debate, throughout the DoD in recent years. In the current era of DoD 
downsizing and reduced budgets, the ability to relate the cost of a system to an 
associated, and appropriate, measure of effectiveness will become increasingly 
important. 
2. The Key Issues 
In this report, the author will attempt to add to the system effectiveness-related 
body of knowledge by addressing the following key issues: 
1. "What is system effectiveness?" 
2. "How is system effectiveness measured or quantified?" 
3. "What are the levels at which system effectiveness should be 
measured?" 
4. "How are system attributes measured?" 
5. "What are some possible system effectiveness models, or hierarchies, 
which link system attribute metrics to system effectiveness measure- 
ment?" 
As a prelude to later examination of these key issues, the next chapter will 
present applicable excerpts from the official guidance related to system effectiveness 
in the system acquisition process. 

III. THE OFFICIAL GUIDANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will present the applicable guidance related to the topic of system 
effectiveness, as found in the current DoD 5000 series instructions and the U.S. Code, 
Title 10. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs), along with measures of performance 
(MOPs), schedule, and cost, are developed during the system acquisition process and 
are described in several key documents. The chapter will begin with a brief overview 
of the system acquisition process, followed by a detailed description of the pertinent 
information included in the key documents. The Marine Corps Predator Short Range 
Assault Weapon (SRAW) and Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) 
systems will be used as examples throughout the chapter. 
B. THE SYSTEM ACQUISITION PROCESS - AN OVERVIEW 
The five major milestone decision points and the five phases of the system 
acquisition process, illustrated in Figure 3.1, provide the basis for comprehensive 
management and progressive decisionmaking associated with program maturation. 
The process begins with the development of the Mission Need Statement (MNS). 
Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval, marks the initial formal interface between the 
system requirements generation and subsequent system acquisition management 
processes. Milestone 1 marks the official start of a new system-related acquisition 
program. Subsequent phases and milestone decision points facilitate the orderly 
translation of broadly stated mission needs into system attribute requirements and a 
stable design that can be produced efficiently. 
ACQUISITION MILESTONES & PHASES 
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Figure 3.1. Acquisition Milestones & Phases 
C.       THE KEY DOCUMENTS AND THEIR RELATED OUTPUTS 
The key documents in the system acquisition process are the Mission Need 
Statement (MNS), the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEA), the 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD), the Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP), and the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). Using actual examples from 
the Marine Corps Predator SRAW system, Table 3.1 provides an overview of the 
primary outputs of these documents. With the exception of the MNS, these 
documents require updating through the system acquisition process as the system 
evolves from a concept to a final end product. 
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DOCUMENT OUTPUT EXAMPLE (PREDATOR) 
MNS Desired Operational Capabilities The System must be capable of being fired safely from 
enclosed areas such as buildings or bunkers. 
COEA Functional Objectives (FOs) System must defeat tanks and armored vehicles equipped 
with explosive reactive armor. 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) Percent Enemy Armored Fighting Vehicles Destroyed. 
Measures of Performance (MOPs) Must have a range of at least 600m. 
ORD Performance Parameters Warhead must be capable of meeting the threshold 
target-defeat criteria against a Soviet T-80 MBT with 
ERA. 
Logistics and Readiness 
Requirements 
Predator will consist of a launcher and missile as a 
singular unit for issue. The launcher will be considered a 
disposable item upon firing of the missile. 
Critical System Characteristics 
(CSCs) 
The system must be capable of operating properly in all 
battefield environments with its only limitation being the 
capabilities of the current crew-served night vision sight. 
TEMP Critical Operational Issues (COIs) Will the system enhance the chances of survivability of 
Marines firing it in comparison to the current light 
antiarmor system? 
Minimum Acceptable Operational 
Performance Requirements 
(MAOPRs) 
System will be man-portable, not to exceed 20 lbs in 
weight and 40 inches in length. 
Critical Technical Parameters 
(CTPs) 
Accuracy for stationary target > .5Ph at 600m. 
APB Key Performance Parameters 
(KPPs) 
Stationary Target Ph Threshold .5 at 600m/Objective .8 at 
600m. 
Table 3.1. The Key Documents and Their Primary Outputs [Ref. 3] 
D.       THE MISSION NEED STATEMENT (MNS) 
The system acquisition process begins with the development of a mission need 
statement (MNS) by the user or operating command. To assist the reader's 
understanding of the DoD guidance concerning the MNS, definitions and examples 
of "operational scenario" and "mission" are given below: 
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1.        Operational Scenario 
Operational scenarios are realistic descriptions of potential wartime operations. 
An example of an operational scenario, from the AAAV Supplemental Analysis, is 
provided: 
This scenario included two Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), one 
ashore and one afloat. In a coordinated counteroffensive, the land- 
based MEF attacks northwest, while the afloat MEF lands north of the 
Orange (enemy) forces. The concept is to trap and neutralize the 
enemy units between the two MEFs. Early in the counterattack, the 
following preparatory actions were taken: 
A Blue Regiment conducted a heliborne assault to remove an 
artillery threat to two Littoral Penetration Sites (LPS) selected 
for the surface assault. 
A Marine Infantry Regiment and an Artillery Battalion were 
inserted vertically and established an inland fire base to support 
the surface assault. 
A Marine Infantry Regiment landed vertically, west of the 
Littoral Penetration Zone (LPZ) and established blocking 
positions to facilitate a surface assault by the afloat Regimental 
Landing Team (RLT). 
Continuing with the scenario, a surface amphibious assault begins 
approximately one hour after blocking positions were established by the 
vertical assault. A Marine RLT afloat, which consists of 4,500 
Marines, is tasked to conduct a night surface assault across two 
designated beaches and maneuver to rapidly seize an inland town. The 
RLT will then establish blocking positions in the vicinity of the town 
to trap Orange forces attempting escape to the northwest. [Ref. 4:pp. 
iv-v] 
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2. Mission and Mission Tasks 
A mission is an operational task performed by military personnel and/or 
military systems as part of an operational scenario. Most missions can be sub-divided 
into measurable mission tasks or functional objectives. For example, the aforemen- 
tioned RLT mission of trapping Orange forces consists of several mission tasks, some 
of which relate directly to the AAAV, such as the ship-to-shore movement of 4,500 
Marines across two designated beaches in a night assault. 
3. The DoD Guidance 
The DoD guidance concerning the MNS states: 
1. Mission. Identify and describe the mission need or 
deficiency. Define the need in terms of mission, objectives, and 
general capabilities. Do not discuss the need in terms of specific 
equipment or system-specific performance characteristics. 
2. Constraints. Describe, as applicable, key boundary 
conditions related to infrastructure support that may impact on 
satisfying the need; logistics support; transportation; mapping; charting 
and geodosy support; manpower; personnel; and training constraints; 
command, control, communications, and intelligence interfaces; 
security; and standardization or interoperability within the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or with other allies or DoD 
Components. Address the operational environments (including 
conventional; initial nuclear weapons effects; nuclear, biological, and 
chemical contamination (NBCC); electronic; and natural) in which the 
mission is expected to be accomplished. Define the level of desired 
mission capability in these environments. [Ref. 5:p. 2-1-1] 
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E.       THE COST AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
(COEA) 
Based on the MNS, a cost and operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) is 
developed for several alternative concepts. The COEA is the most important 
document in the system effectiveness measurement process. As part of the COEA, 
mission needs are sub-divided into functional objectives (mission tasks). Also, 
alternative system concepts which fulfill the desired mission need are compared using 
Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs). The DoD 
guidance concerning the COEA states: 
1. COEAs aid decision making by illuminating the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives being 
considered and showing the sensitivity of each alternatives to 
possible changes in key assumptions (e.g., the threat) or 
variables (e.g., selected performance capabilities). Accordingly, 
the analysis takes the form of a problem of choice. The COEA 
should aid decisionmakers in judging whether or not any of the 
proposed alternatives to the current program (i.e., the status quo) 
offer sufficient military benefit to be worth the cost. 
2. The COEA will typically draw on several sub-analyses. These 
include analyses of mission needs, the threat and U.S. 
capabilities, the interrelationship of systems, the contribution of 
multi-role systems, measures of effectiveness, costs, and cost- 
effectiveness comparisons. 
3. Functional Objectives (FOs). Statements describing, in 
quantitative terms, the tasks a system needs to perform in 
accomplishing the mission(s). They depend on the type of 
system at issue. For example, when analyzing transportation 
systems, functional objectives are stated in movement 
requirements. For firepower systems, they reflect the types of 
targets to be engaged. The effectiveness of system alternatives 
is the direct result of the degree to which the functional 
objectives are attained. [Ref. 5:pp. 8-4 and 8-5] 
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4. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). To judge whether an 
alternative is worthwhile, one must first determine what it takes 
to make a difference. Measures of effectiveness should be 
defined to measure operational capabilities in terms of 
engagement or battle outcomes. 
5. Measures of Performance (MOPs). Measures of performance, 
such as weight and speed, should relate to the measures of 
effectiveness such that the effect of a change in the measure of 
performance can be related to a change in the measure of 
effectiveness. [Ref. 6:pp. 4-E-l - 4-E-3] 
F.       THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD) 
Based on the initial COEA, an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 
is developed. The ORD translates the COEA FOs/MOEs/MOPs into system-specific 
operational requirements. Thus, the ORD defines the system attribute requirements, 
or performance parameters necessary to bring about the overall system effectiveness 
defined in the COEA. To assist the reader's understanding of the DoD guidance 
concerning the ORD, the DoD definition of performance parameter is provided: 
1. Performance Parameter 
Those operational and support characteristics of a specific system that 
allow it to effectively and efficiently perform its assigned mission over 
time. The support characteristics of the system include both support- 
ability aspects of design and the support elements necessary for system 
operation. [Ref. 6:p. 15-13] 
2. The DoD Guidance 
The DoD guidance concerning the format for the ORD states: 
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a.        Capabilities Required 
Identify performance capabilities and characteristics required. 
State in operational terms and prioritize if possible. Specify each 
performance parameter in terms of a minimum acceptable value 
(threshold) required to satisfy the mission need and a performance 
objective. The objective should represent a measurable, beneficial 
increase in capability or operations and support above the threshold. 
(1) System Performance. Include system perform- 
ance parameters such as range, accuracy, payload, speed, mission 
reliability, etc. Describe mission scenarios (wartime and peacetime, if 
different in terms of mission profiles, employment tactics, and 
environmental conditions (all inclusive; natural and man-made, e.g., 
weather, countermeasures, ocean acoustics, etc). 
(2) Logistics and Readiness. (These are measures 
related to system supportability). Include measures of mission-capable 
rate, operational availability, frequency and duration of preventive or 
scheduled maintenance actions, etc. Describe in terms of mission 
requirements considering both wartime and peacetime logistics 
operations. Identify combat support require-ments including battle 
assessment damage repair capability, mobility requirements, expected 
maintenance manpower and skill levels, and surge and mobilization 
objectives and capabilities. [Ref. 5:pp. 3-1-1 - 3-1-2] 
(3) Critical System Characteristics. (These are) those 
design features that determine how well the proposed concept or system 
will function in its intended environment. Critical system characteris- 
tics include survivability, transportability, energy efficiency, and 
interoperability, standardization, and compatibility with other forces 
and systems including support infrastructure. [Ref. 6:p. 4-C-l] 
Address electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) and Wartime 
Reserve Modes (WARM) requirements; conventional, initial nuclear 
weapons effects, and nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination 
(NBCC), survivability; natural environmental factors (such as climatic, 
terrain, and oceanographic factors); and electromagnetic compatibility 
and frequency spectrum assignment for systems operating in the 
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electromagnetic spectrum. Define the expected mission capability 
(e.g., full, percent degraded, etc) in the various environments. Include 
applicable safety parameters such as those related to system, nuclear, 
explosive, and flight safety. Identify communications, information, and 
physical and operational security needs. [Ref. 5:p. 3-1-2] 
G.       THE TEST AND EVALUATION MASTER PLAN (TEMP) 
The TEMP identifies the necessary operational test and evaluation (OT&E) 
activities and translates the COEA and ORE) effectiveness and performance 
requirements into testable parameters. To assist the reader's understanding of the 
DoD guidance concerning the TEMP, definitions for "operational effectiveness" and 
"operational suitability", along with the U.S. Code, Title 10 guidance concerning 
operational testing, are provided: 
1. Operational Effectiveness. The overall degree of mission 
accomplishment of a system when used by representative 
personnel in the environment planned or expected (e.g., natural, 
electronic, threat etc.) for operational employment of the system 
considering organization, doctrine, tactics, survivability, 
vulnerability, and threat (including countermeasures, initial 
nuclear weapons effects, nuclear, biological, and chemical 
contamination (NBCC) threats). 
2. Operational Suitability. The degree to which a system can be 
placed satisfactorily in field use with consideration given to 
availability, compatibility, transportability, interoperability, 
reliability, wartime usage rates, maintainability, safety, human 
factors, manpower supportability, logistic supportability, natural 
environmental effects, documentation, and training. [Ref. 6:p. 
15-13] 
3. U.S. Code, Title 10 Guidance. (The term "operational test and 
evaluation" means) the field test, under realistic combat 
conditions, of any item of (or key component of) weapons, 
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equipment, or munitions for the purpose of determining the 
effectiveness and suitability of the weapons, equipment, or 
munitions for use in combat by typical military users. [Ref. 7:p. 
400] 
4.        The DoD Guidance. The DoD guidance concerning the TEMP 
format states: 
a.        Critical Operational Issues 
(1) List in this section the critical operational issues. 
Critical operational issues are the operational effectiveness and 
operational suitability issues (not parameters, objectives, or thresholds) 
that must be examined in operational test and evaluation to 
evaluate/assess the system's capability to perform its mission.... 
(2) If every critical operational issue is resolved 
favorably, the system should be operationally effective and opera- 
tionally suitable when employed in its intended environment by typical 
users. [Ref. 5:pp. 7-1-2 and 7-1-3] 
(a) Minimum Acceptable Operational Per- 
formance Requirements. Reference the 
Operational Requirements Document and summarize the critical 
operational effectiveness and suitability parameters and constraints 
(manpower, personnel, training, software, computer resources, trans- 
portation (lift), and etc.) described therein. 
(b) Critical Technical Parameters. List in 
matrix format the critical technical parameters of the system (including 
software maturity and performance measures) that have been evaluated 
or will be evaluated during the remaining phases of developmental 
testing. Critical technical parameters are derived from the Operational 
Requirements Document, critical system characteristics, and technical 
performance measures and should include the parameters in the 
acquisition program baseline. 
Next to each technical parameter, list the accompanying 
objectives and thresholds... [Ref. 5:pp. 7-1-3] 
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H.       THE ACQUISITION PROGRAM BASELINE (APB) 
The APB is the program manager's tool for monitoring system development 
and for identifying key cost, schedule, and performance parameters for Milestone 
decision making. Key performance parameters are found in the Performance Baseline 
of the APB. To assist the reader's understanding of the DoD guidance concerning the 
performance portion of the APB, definitions for "key performance parameters", 
"thresholds", and "objectives", and an example of key performance parameters for a 
particular system, the AAAV(F), are provided: 
1. Key Performance Parameters. "Those system-related parameters that 
if the thresholds are not met, the milestone decision authority would 
require a reevaluation of alternative concepts or design approaches" 
[Ref. 6:p. 11-A-l-l] 
2. Thresholds. "Thresholds are the minimum acceptable value required 
to satisfy the mission need." [Ref. 6:p. 4-B-l ] 
3. Objectives. Objectives are also provided for key parameters, and are 
defined as a "measurable, beneficial increase in capability or operations 
support above the threshold." [Ref. 5:p. 3-1-1] 
4. Key Performance Parameters - Example. 
Table 3.2 shows the key performance parameters from the AAAV(F) 




OBJECTIVE/THRESHOLD RELATED SYSTEM 
ATTRIBUTE 
High Water Speed (knots) 25/20 Speed 
Forward Speed on a Hard 
Surface Road (k/h) 
72/69 Speed 




Armor Protection Against 
(millimeter/meter) 
(30/1000)/( 14.5/300) Survivability 
Mean Time Between Critical 
Mission Failure (hrs) 
(MTBCMF) 
95/70 Reliability 
Table 3.2. AAAV(F) Key Performance Parameters [Ref. 8] 
The DoD guidance. The DoD guidance concerning the performance 
baseline portion of APB states: 
a.        The Performance Baseline 
Each commodity has a few parameters which are critical to that 
commodity and must be addressed (e.g., aircraft weight, missile range, 
reliability). List these key critical parameters.... Enter acquisition 
program baseline performance requirements for parameters tailored to 
each program. Performance objectives and thresholds will be derived 
from the Operational Requirements Document and the results of the 
previous acquisition phase. Performance objectives and thresholds 
must be reviewed by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (for 
acquisition category ID programs) at each milestone, and ultimately be 
verifiable by developmental and operational testing. Performance 
includes operational, technical, and supportability parameters. [Ref. 
5:pp. 14-1-3 and 14-1-7] 
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I. THE NEW DRAFT DODI 5000.2 GUIDANCE 
As of October 1995, an updated revision of the DoDI 5000.2 has been issued 
for review by the DoD community. In this revision, which has not yet been formally 
approved, the guidance concerning the aforementioned key documents does not 
significantly change, except for the guidance concerning the COEA. The new draft 
DoDI 5000.2 replaces the current term "COEA" with the term "Analysis of 
Alternatives", along with the following, significantly less specific guidance: 
...These analyses are intended to aid and Document Decisionmaking by 
illuminating the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
alternatives being considered. Show the sensitivity of each alternative 
to possible changes in key assumptions (e.g., threat) or variables (e.g., 
selected performance capabilities). The analysis shall aid decision- 
makers in judging whether or not any of the proposed alternatives to an 
existing system offer sufficient military benefit to be worth the cost. 
There shall be a clear linkage between the analysis of alternatives, and 
requirements, and system evaluation measures of effectiveness. [Ref. 
9:p. 2.2] 
The reader should be aware that this change, if ultimately accepted, may affect 
some of the information in this thesis. However, since the updated guidance has not 
been formally approved, the author will base this thesis on the existing DoDI 5000.2 
guidance. 
J.        SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL GUIDANCE 
The MNS, COEA, ORD, TEMP, and APB are the key documents used in 
developing systems in response to mission needs. It is important to note that the 
COEA, ORD, TEMP, and APB are not static documents, but are updated throughout 
the system development process as the system is developed in greater detail. The 
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provided excerpts from the official guidance establish a basis for further examination 
of system effectiveness measurement and its relation to measures of system attributes. 
K.       BEYOND THE OFFICIAL GUIDANCE 
Despite the detailed information provided in this chapter, there are certain 
aspects of system effectiveness which require further clarification. Specifically, the 
official guidance inadequately addresses the levels at which system effectiveness can 
be measured, the definition of system effectiveness, the measurement of system 
attributes, and possible models/hierarchies for linking measures of system attributes 
to measures of system effectiveness. 
The remainder of this thesis will provide information related to these missing 
aspects of system effectiveness guidance. In the next chapter, the author will offer a 
alternative viewpoint to the official guidance concerning the level(s) at which system 
effectiveness should be measured, which will then be incorporated into a definition 
for system effectiveness. In the remaining chapters, some various models/hierarchies 
for linking measures of system attributes to measures of system effectiveness will be 
offered. 
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IV. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS - TWO LEVELS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the current official guidance concerning system 
effectiveness stated that measures of effectiveness (MOEs) must be made in terms of 
engagement or battle outcome (e.g., loss-exchange ratios, residual force ratios, etc.). 
In this chapter, the author will provide an additional viewpoint, that system 
effectiveness should also be measured in terms of mission accomplishment (e.g., 
capability to accomplish logistic resupply operations, capability to accomplish TRAP 
operations). This additional viewpoint will be shown to be consistent with 1) the 
DoD guidance concerning the Concept Exploration and Definition (CE/D) Phase, 2) 
the Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) process, and 3) Army and Marine Corps 
guidance. Furthermore, excerpts from the Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) study, 
in which the MV-22 was chosen over alternative systems, will show that mission- 
level MOEs are already in use. Finally, an argument will be made that measuring 
system effectiveness at the mission level, in addition to the battle level, provides a 
better opportunity for system development and test personnel to link system attributes 
to system effectiveness. 
B. THE OFFICIAL GUIDANCE - MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The official guidance concerning measures of effectiveness, given in Chapter 
III and shown below, specifies only one level at which system effectiveness should 
be measured. 
To judge whether or not an alternative is worthwhile, one must first 
determine what it takes to make a difference. Measures of 
effectiveness should be defined to measure operational capabilities 
in terms of engagement or battle outcomes. [Ref. 6:p. 4-E-3] 
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The following sections will demonstrate that MOEs should also be defined in 
terms of mission outcomes. 
C.       THE CONCEPT EXPLORATION AND DEFINITION (CE/D) PHASE 
1.        The Official Guidance 
In contrast to the current battle-level MOE guidance, other guidance 
concerning the CE/D Phase leads to an additional viewpoint as to the level at which 
system effectiveness can be measured. The following excerpts, which were excluded 
from the previous chapter due to their inapplicability to a particular key document, 
support this argument: 
a. Milestone 0, Concept Studies Approval, marks the initial 
formal interface between the requirements generation 
and acquisition management systems. As a result of this 
review (in the CE/D Phase), studies are conducted of 
materiel concepts to identify the most promising 
potential solution(s) to validated mission needs. 
b. Subsequent phases and milestone decision points 
facilitate the orderly translation of broadly stated 
mission needs into system specific performance 
requirements and a stable design hat can be produced 
efficiently. [Ref. 6: pp. 2-1 and 2 2] 
2.        Two Levels for Measurement 
a.        Two Levels for Measuring System Effectiveness 
From the MOE guidance and CE/D phase guidance, one can arrive at 
two possible levels for measuring system effectiveness. On the one hand, the MOE 
guidance, "measures of effectiveness should be defined to measure operational 
capabilities in terms of engagement or battle outcomes", leads to the conclusion that 
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system effectiveness must be measured at the battle level. On the other hand, the 
CE/D phase guidance, "studies are conducted of materiel concepts to identify the most 
promising potential solution(s) to validated mission needs", and "translation of 
broadly stated mission needs", leads to the conclusion that system effectiveness 
should also be measured in terms of mission accomplishment, at the mission level. 
b.        Mission Needs 
Now, there would be no inconsistency between these two levels if 
mission needs were stated explicitly in terms of desired engagement or battle 
outcomes. However, this is usually not the case. The following excerpts from the 
official guidance concerning the mission need statement (MNS) support this 
argument: 
(1) Mission. Identify and describe the mission need 
or deficiency. Define the need in terms of mission, objectives, and 
general capabilities. Do not discuss the need in terms of specific 
equipment or system-specific performance characteristics. 
(2) Constraints. Describe, as applicable, key 
boundary conditions related to infrastructure support that may impact 
on satisfying the need; logistics support; transportation; mapping; 
charting and geodosy support; manpower; personnel; and training 
constraints; command, control, communications, and intelligence 
interfaces; security; and standardization or interoperability within the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or with other allies or 
DoD Components. Address the operational environments (including 
conventional; initial nuclear weapons effects; nuclear, biological, and 
chemical contamina-tion (NBCC); electronic; and natural) in which the 
mission is expected to be accomplished. Define the level of desired 
mission capability in these environments. [Ref. 5 :p. 2-1-1) 
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3.        Summary 
Since mission need statements are expressed in terms of operational 
capabilities required to conduct missions (at the mission level), the search for system 
solutions to those needs requires measuring the effectiveness of alternative systems 
at both the battle and mission level. For some major systems, such as an aircraft 
carrier, mission accomplishment might best be stated as an engagement or battle 
outcome. However, for most systems, which operate at a lower level, mission 
accomplishment h an essential intermediate step that combines with a multitude of 
other factors to ultimately result in an engagement or battle outcome. 
D.       THE OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (OT&E) PROCESS 
1.        The DoD Guidance 
Measuring system effectiveness at the mission level is also consistent with the 
guidance concerning the Operational Test and Evaluation process. The following 
excerpts from the official guidance support this argument: 
The term "operational test and evaluation" means "the field test, under 
realistic combat conditions, of any item of (or key component of) 
weapons, equipment, or munitions for the purpose of determining the 
effectiveness and suitability of the weapons, equipment, or munitions 
for use in combat by typical military users. [Ref. 7:p. 400] 
Operational Effectiveness. The overall degree of mission 
accomplishment of a system when used by representative personnel in 
the environment planned or expected (e.g., natural, electronic, threat 
etc.) for operational employment of the system considering organiza- 
tion, doctrine, tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat (including 
countermeasures, initial nuclear weapons effects, nuclear, biological, 
and chemical contamination (NBCC) threats). [Ref. 6:p. 15-13] 
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2. Two Levels 
As in the earlier section, one could argue that the level for measuring 
operational effectiveness (mission accomplishment) is usually different than the 
currently-mandated level for measures of effectiveness (engagements or battle 
outcomes). 
3. The Commander, OT&E Draft "Battle Outcome" MOEs Letter 
The following excerpt from a draft letter dated 22 February 1994, from the 
Commander of the Navy's operational test and evaluation force, highlights some 
serious problems related to the current guidance concerning the battle level for 
MOEs: 
OSD/DOT&E are interpreting DODINST 5000.2 requirements for 
linkage of COEA MOEs to operational testing and the use of battle 
outcome MOEs with such rigidity that I believe this causes a significant 
threat to all Navy oversight programs. The problem with this approach 
is that a requirement to use high-level MOEs, for many systems, 
obscures real effectiveness and suitability defining measures. This 
could lead directly to poor acquisition decisions. 
The current OSD/DOT&E philosophy is that all systems can and must 
be tested in terms of "outcome of the battle" MOEs, and that all these 
MOEs must be thresholded. I do not believe this is a sound policy for 
now or in the future. Most of the systems we test will not determine the 
outcome of a battle and they are only one contributor among a number 
of powerful factors which will determine the outcome of an 
engagement.... 
The less influence a system exerts on the outcome of the battle, the 
more obscure the effectiveness and suitability of these systems in high- 
level MOEs become.... The current trend of overemphasis on battle 
outcome level MOEs and the strict requirement for their linkage will 
directly lead to unsatisfactory results; important acquisition decisions 
will be based on inappropriate parameters; and the cost of testing will 
increase because battle outcome MOEs will require considerably more 
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testing than necessary to isolate the system's true effectiveness.... I 
believe we should not transfer this problem to the future. Now is the 
time for a solution.... The goal for the long-term and short-term 
approach is to ensure testable, measurable, and meaningful MOEs are 
used to evaluate a weapon system's worth. [Ref 10:pp. 1-2] 
4.        Summary 
The operational test community would benefit from allowing the measurement 
of system effectiveness at both the battle and mission levels. One can derive from the 
Commander, OT&E letter that, for many systems which do not contribute directly to 
a battle-level outcome, mission-level MOEs may provide a better indication of a 
system's true effectiveness and suitability. 
E.       ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GUIDANCE 
1.        The Guidance 
A primary source of guidance used by the Army and the Marine Corps for 
measuring system effectiveness is the TRADOC PAM 11-8, "Operational Effective- 
ness". The following excerpts support the measurement of system effectiveness at the 
mission level. 
Effectiveness is the degree (or measure) to which a system performs its 
stated mission. The system is effective if it does what the require- 
ment specifies.... An MOE is a quantitative indicator of the ability of 
a system to accomplish its designated task. [Ref. 1 l:p. 12] 
2.        Summary 
Thus, the argument for measuring system effectiveness at the mission level is 
enhanced by the TRADOC guidance. In reference to system effectiveness, the 
publication uses the terms "stated mission", "the requirement", and "designated task". 
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These are obviously not references to some battle outcome, but are rather references 
to specific mission accomplishment. 
F.       THE MEDIUM LIFT REPLACEMENT (MLR) STUDY 
1. Background 
In the Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) study, or Cost and Operational 
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) [Ref. 12], dated 24 August 1994, the MLR aircraft 
included the MV-22 Osprey and various helicopters. Using the terms "operational" 
and "tactical", the MLR study compared the alternative aircraft at the battle and 
mission levels. Applicable excerpts from the study are given below. 
2. The Operational Level 
Table 4.1 shows the primary level MOEs at the operational (battle) level. 
MOE 1-1 
MOE 1-2 
Contributions of the MLR alternatives to "WIN QUICKLY" 
Contributions of the MLR alternatives to "WIN DECISIVELY" 
MOE 1-3 Contributions of the MLR alternatives to "DOMINATE 
BATTLESPACE" 
MOE 1-4 Contributions of the MLR alternatives to "MINIMIZE 
CASUALTIES" 
MOE 1-5 Contributions of the MLR alternatives to "GENERATE 
OVERWHELMING TEMPO" 
Table 4.1. MLR Study - Primary Operational (Battle) Level MOEs 
At this level, the contributions of the MLR aircraft to joint operations and the 
power projection capabilities of Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEF) were evaluated. 
The focus was on the effects the fleets of different MLR aircraft have on the battle 
outcomes of the Blue and Orange forces.  The MOEs were stated in the tenets of 
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Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). The battle was represented by two 
operational situations (OPSITS) modeled in the Corps Battle Analyzer (CORBAN). 
The distinguishing input was the different mission completion times that the different 
MLR aircraft fleets had on force buildup during assault operations. In addition to the 
primary level MOEs, there were 23 other secondary level MOEs such as orange 
battalions neutralized, loss-exchange ratios, etc. 
3.        The Tactical Level 







Capability of MLR alternatives to build up forces 
Survivability of MLR alternatives 
Capability of MLR alternatives to accomplish logistics resupply operations 
Capability of MLR alternatives to accomplish MEDEVAC operations 
Capability of MLR alternatives to accomplish TRAP operations 
Capability of MLR alternatives to accomplish SAR operations 
Table 4.2. MLR Study Primary Tactical (Mission) Level MOEs 
On the tactical level, the effects of the MLR alternatives on a variety of 
missions were evaluated. At this level, the MOEs focused on the effects the fleets of 
different MLR aircraft had on force-buildup rates, logistics resupply operations, 
medevac operations, TRAP operations, and SAR operations. Additionally, an MOE 
specifically related to survivability was used. In the evaluation of force buildup rates 
and logistics resupply missions, three tactical situations (TACSITs) modeled in the 
Amphibious Assault Model (AAM) were used. The primary inputs for the AAM 
were system attributes such as aircraft speed, altitude, range, payload,  fuel 
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expenditure, reliability, maintainability, and availability. For the remaining MOEs, 
spreadsheet models were used, all with system attributes as inputs. In addition to the 
primary level MOEs, there were 11 other secondary level MOEs such as TRAP 
completion time, medevac lives saved, etc. 
4.        Summary 
One can see that system effectiveness for the MLR study was measured at both 
the battle (operational) and mission (tactical) levels. At the battle level, the CORBAN 
model used one primary input, mission completion time, to produce 28 operational 
level MOEs. These MOEs were used to show the degree of effectiveness that the V- 
22, the system with the shortest mission completion time, had over the other systems 
at the battle level. At the mission level, numerous system attributes were used as 
inputs to the various models. Seventeen MOEs were used to show the degree of 
effectiveness that the V-22, due to its superior performance capabilities, had over 
competing systems at the mission level. 
G.       SYSTEM DESIGN AND TEST 
In a further argument for mission-level MOEs, system engineers do not usually 
develop systems with an engagement or battle outcome in mind. They develop 
systems to meet specific mission-related requirements. Thus, an effectiveness 
threshold for time to move Marines from ship-to-shore gives the engineer a basis 
upon which to develop requirements for system attributes such as speed and carrying 
capacity. Likewise, test and evaluation personnel do not usually test systems to meet 
certain engagement or battle outcome objectives. They test systems to see if desired 
system attribute requirements are met and if the system meets specific mission 
requirements. Although battle-level MOEs are useful in determining how systems 
will affect the outcome of the battle, mission-level MOEs provide a better basis upon 
which to design and test systems. 
31 
H.       AN IMPORTANT CONCLUSION 
All of the above analyses lead to an important conclusion. System 
effectiveness should be measured at the mission level, in terms of mission tasks 
(i.e., broad operational capabilities), in addition to the battle level, in terms of 
engagement or battle outcomes. For instance, one measure of effectiveness for 
comparing the V-22 to alternative systems could be stated in terms of mission 
completion time to move a MEF-sized assault element from ship-to-shore. 
Obviously, the system which accomplishes this mission in the shortest amount of 
time, without an unacceptable number of casualties, will be the more effective system 
in meeting that particular mission need. Stating this effectiveness in battle-related 
terms may or may not be reasonable, depending on the relation of the system's 
mission to battle-level outcomes. As shown in the MLR study, battle-level 
effectiveness measures for major systems like the MV-22 may be derived using 
models based on mission-level effectiveness measures, such as mission completion 
time. 
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V. THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The military services develop and employ systems in order to accomplish their 
assigned missions. In the system development process, the measurement of system 
effectiveness is used, along with the associated cost, to choose between competing 
system designs. Thus, the measurement of system effectiveness is a key element of 
the system acquisition process. 
Previous chapters described the current system effectiveness and performance 
(attribute) measurement process, and established that system effectiveness should be 
measured at both the battle and mission levels. This chapter will provide a definition 
for system effectiveness and a deeper review of the concept of system effectiveness, 
with emphasis on the relationship between system attributes, system design, and 
system effectiveness at the mission level. A discussion of system design and 
operational test and evaluation considerations will be included. Following chapters 
will focus on possible models for linking system attributes to quantify measures of 
effectiveness at the mission level. 
B. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS DEFINED 
Based on the previous chapters, definitions for system effectiveness and 
measure of effectiveness are now proposed: 
System Effectiveness. The ability of a system to accomplish a mission, and 
achieve a favorable battle outcome, in an optimum manner. 
Measure of Effectiveness. An outcome-oriented measure of a system's 
effectiveness. 
The measurement of system effectiveness may be a relative, not absolute, 
measure of a system's utility compared to other systems. However, once a particular 
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system concept has been chosen for development, system effectiveness must be 
translated into absolute threshold values that provide a basis upon which system 
attribute specifications can be developed. Using this definition of system 
effectiveness, this chapter will provide a more in-depth discussion of how system 
effectiveness measurement at the mission level relates to the overall system design 
process. 
C.       THE CHALLENGE OF SYSTEM DESIGN 
1. Relationship Between System Attributes and System Effectiveness 
Depending on the system, there are many system attributes which can 
potentially contribute to system effectiveness. Keeping in mind the required 
relationship between measures of performance (attributes) and measures of 
effectiveness, the challenge of system design is to link the measures of the many 
system attributes to system effectiveness. This is accomplished through the use of 
tradeoff analyses. 
2. Tradeoff Analyses 
The current official guidance concerning tradeoff analyses (with the term 
"attribute" inserted as applicable) states: 
a.        Tradeoff Analyses 
They (tradeoff analyses) display the implications of "trading" 
one set of controllable variables (such as system attribute measure- 
ments) for another (such as cost).... To do a tradeoff analysis, one must 
identify areas of uncertainty, conduct sensitivity analyses, and establish 
thresholds. 
(1) Uncertainty. Tradeoff analyses identify areas of 
uncertainty and estimate their extent. The implications of the 
uncertainties are examined in cost models and effectiveness models. 
This serves to highlight for decision makers the areas in which 
uncertainties most affect the analysis and, therefore, its results. 
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(2) Sensitivity. Sensitivity analyses show explicitly 
how military utility is affected by changes in system attributes. They 
show how system attributes (size, weight, etc.) drive performance, and 
how performance affects military utility or effectiveness. Parameters 
should be varied individually where it is reasonable to do so. The 
uncertainty inherent in estimating attributes and in determining their 
impact should be portrayed explicitly. 
(a) As a result of this step, the analysis is able 
to show "where we are on the curve": whether the desired performance 
is stretching the system to the point that increases in performance add 
little of benefit; whether the results are sensitive to change. 
(b) In a very real sense, there are few "hard, 
unchallengeable" requirements in weapons acquisition. Certain 
attributes and levels of effectiveness are not "essential, regardless of 
cost." Sensitivity analysis illuminates how important it is to 
incorporate these features into a system. 
(3) Thresholds. An important step in developing a 
cost and operational effectiveness analysis is to determine thresholds, 
the maximum cost or minimum acceptable performance that could be 
tolerated in a system. In order to approach thresholds and acceptability 
thresholds reasonably, senior decision makers and users must be 
directly involved in reviewing the combinations of cost and 
performance that would be acceptable. 
(a) Cost thresholds are expressions of value. 
They answer questions such as: How valuable is a given capability to 
the Service? How much would a Service be willing to give up in order 
to obtain that capability? At what point would it be preferable to drop 
the idea in favor of some other course of action? 
(b) Performance thresholds may be more 
difficult to determine but are at least as important as cost thresholds. 
They show at what point degradations in performance yield outcomes 
that no longer satisfy the mission need. Together, cost and performance 
thresholds help in determining which alternatives are worthwhile and 
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what combinations or intervals of performance and cost are acceptable. 
[Ref. 5 :pp. 8-10 and 8-11] 
3.        Optimal System Design 
As stated earlier, system effectiveness measurement at the mission level 
provides the most direct means of linking system attributes to system effectiveness. 
Once threshold (minimum acceptable) values for system effectiveness at the mission 
level have been identified, system engineers are faced with determining the optimal 
combination of system attribute specifications (stated as thresholds and objectives) 
that will result in an overall effective, and affordable, system. Since most systems 
are built to accomplish multiple missions, and most missions involve numerous 
mission tasks (functional objectives), this presents a dilemma for the system designer. 
Based on user input regarding the relative importance of all system MOEs to overall 
system effectiveness, the designer determines certain system attributes which become 
key design objectives to which the designer optimizes the overall system design. 
D.       RELATING MOES TO TEST AND EVALUATION OF MOPS 
1. Operational Test and Evaluation 
Once the engineers have developed thresholds and objectives for system 
attributes, the system is built to the desired specifications. Once built, the system 
must be tested and evaluated in a realistic operational setting to ensure that the system 
attribute specifications are achieved. Also at this stage, the attributes should be 
reevaluated in terms of their impact on desired system effectiveness, as reflected by 
the COEA MOEs. 
2. The 1992 USD(A) Memorandum 
The importance of relating measures of effectiveness to the test and evaluation 
of system attributes was reemphasized in a 1992 Memorandum from the Under 
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Secretary of Defense for Acquisition [Ref. 13]. A summary of the guidance (with the 
term "attribute" inserted where applicable) found in that memorandum is included in 
this section. 
a. The Documents 
(1) The Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
(COEA). The DoD component, in the process of performing a Milestone I COEA, 
should identify the MOEs to be used in the COEA and show how these MOEs are 
derived from the Mission Need Statement (MNS). Each COEA should include MOEs 
reflecting operational utility that can be tested. For those MOEs that cannot be 
directly tested, the COEA should show how changes in testable attributes or MOPs 
can be related to changes in COEA MOEs. 
(2) The Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The 
MOEs and related MOPs should be included in the ORD. 
(3) The Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). The key 
MOEs and MOPs should also be included in the APB subject to review by the 
Requirements Validation Authority and approval by the Milestone Decision 
Authority. 
(4) Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The TEMP 
should document how the COEA MOEs and related MOPs will be addressed in the 
test and evaluation of the selected alternative system. 
b. Linking MOEs to Test Results 
The Milestone Decision Authority and the Requirements Validation 
Authority should be able to review the COEA using test results to reaffirm the 
decision that the selected alternative is an effective approach to satisfying an 
operational requirement. If the system effectiveness (MOE) thresholds stipulated in 
the APB and ORD and used in the COEA are not supported by test results, the COEA 
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sensitivity analyses should be available to assist in determining whether the system, 
as tested, still offers sufficient military benefit to be worth its cost and whether the 
system can be confirmed to be operational effective and operationally suitable. 
E.       SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS MODELS 
The necessity for measuring system effectiveness in terms that can be linked 
to system attributes has led to the development of several system effectiveness 
models. These models measure system effectiveness in terms of mission 
accomplishment and provide frameworks for linking system attributes to system 
effectiveness. In the next chapter, several of these models will be presented. 
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VI. SEVERAL SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS MODELS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ultimately, the developer must determine the individual and combined effects 
of all system attributes when choosing between alternative systems or system designs. 
In Chapter IV, the author proposed that system effectiveness be measured at both the 
mission and battle levels. Of these two levels, the mission level provides the most 
direct means for relating system attributes to system effectiveness. This argument is 
supported by the abundance of models which link system attributes to system 
effectiveness at the mission level, and the lack of models which link these attributes 
to system effectiveness at the battle level. This chapter will describe several existing 
models which relate mission-level measures of effectiveness to combinations of key 
system attributes. 
These models will be sub-divided into two categories, multiplicative and 
additive. The multiplicative models are the Weapons Systems Effectiveness Industry 
Advisory Committee (WSEIAC), Habayeb, Ball, OPNAVINST 3000.12, Marshall, 
and Giordano models. Only one additive model, the Georgia Tech Aerospace 
Systems Design Laboratory (ASDL) model, will be described. 
B. MULTIPLICATIVE VERSUS ADDITIVE MODELS 
All of the listed models develop mission-specific measures of effectiveness 
through the combination of a few key system attributes into mathematical equations 
involving attribute measures. There are two basic types of these equations. The first, 
more popular, method involves the multiplication of key attribute measures, leading 
to a single overall measure of effectiveness. The second method involves applying 
weighting coefficients to various key attribute measures which reflect the relative 
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importance ofthose attributes, and then adding the weighted attribute value, leading 
to a single overall measure of effectiveness. 
C.       THE MULTIPLICATIVE MODELS 
The multiplicative models which follow are based on the premise that a 
system's effectiveness in accomplishing a particular mission is a product of a few key 
system attributes. These attribute measures are expressed as probabilities, and they 
all must be present, in some degree, for a system to be considered effective. The most 
effective system, using these models, is the one with the highest probability of 
mission accomplishment over time. 
1.        The WSEIAC Model 
a.        The Equation 
In the final Weapons System Effectiveness Industry Advisory 
Committee (WSEIAC) report of January 1965, an equation identifying three key 
system attributes, Availability (A), Dependability (D), and Capability (C), was 
presented for overall system effectiveness (E) evaluation: 
E = [A] * [D] * [C] 







where [E] is the measure of the extent to which a system can be expected to achieve 
a set of specific mission requirements and is a function of availability, dependability, 
and capability. 
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b. Definitions of Key Attributes 
(1) Availability. [A] is an availability row matrix, which 
presents the possible states of system condition at the start of the mission and is a 
function of the relationships among hardware, personnel, and procedures. 
(2) Dependability. [D] is a dependability square matrix, 
which presents the probability that the system (1) will enter and/or occupy any one 
of its significant states during the specific mission, and (2) will perform the functions 
associated with those states. 
(3) Capability. [C] is a capability column matrix, which 
presents the ability of the system to achieve the mission objectives; given the system 
condition(s) during the mission, and specifically accounts for the performance 
spectrum of the system. 
c. Analysis 
This model relies on a single-mission scenario. For the overall mission 
envelope, each possible system state is described and a matrix developed giving 
transition probabilities between states. The product of the three matrices is equal to 
overall system effectiveness. Judgement plays an integral part in arriving at 
capability values as well as in the development of the overall operational scenario for 
which the dependability matrix is set up. 
2.        The HABAYEB Model 
a.        The Equation 
Dr. A. R. Habayeb, the technology manager for weapons command and 
control in NAVAIR's Weapons Division (AIR-912), in his book entitled System 
Effectiveness [Ref. 14], proposes an equation identifying three key system attributes, 
readiness (sr), reliability (r), and design adequacy (da). He places these attributes into 
an analytical structure using a probabilistic notion of system effectiveness (se), 
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Pse = Psr * Pr * Pda 
where Pse is the probability that the system is effective. 
b. Definitions of Key Attributes 
(1) Readiness (Psr). The probability, that, at any point in 
time, the total system is ready to be operated on demand and operates satisfactorily 
when used under specific conditions. 
(2) Reliability (Pr). The probability that the system will 
operate under stated conditions without malfunction for the duration of the mission, 
in other words, the mission reliability of the system. 
(3) Design Adequacy (Pda). The probability that the system 
will successfully accomplish its mission, given that it is operated within design 
specification. It is the measure for performance capability. 
c. Hierarchy of Attributes 
As shown in Table 6.1, Habayeb offers a hierarchy in which lower-level 
attributes are listed below his three key attributes: 
Readiness Reliability Design Adequacy 
Transportability Reliability Survivability 
Reliability Durability Vulnerability 






Table 6.1. Habayeb's Hierarchy of System Attributes 
42 
d.        Analysis 
Habayeb's equation relies on a single-mission scenario. His three key 
attributes are interdependent operationally, and overall system effectiveness requires 
they all occur. The attributes are usually quantified independently of each other, in 
steps at different times. Design adequacy (capability) is initially built into the system, 
and is fixed until changes occur in the environment, e.g., new application or threat. 
Therefore, design adequacy is initially quantified at the early stages of system 
development, determined by simulation or experimentally, while assuming readiness 
and reliability events occur as specified. 
Reliability is built into the system as it is developed and is quantified 
upon development of a system block diagram, parts counts of the system, and the 
failure rates of the hardware. Degradation in reliability is a function of time and the 
environment and assumes design adequacy and readiness are as specified. 
Lastly, readiness presents procedural (e.g., repair, maintenance and 
operational, logistics), and training events, and is estimated from the reliability 
assessment and the mean time to repair (MTTR), and assumes design adequacy is as 
specified. As a caveat, Habayeb states that some aspects of reliability (e.g., 
redundancy, hardware quality and testing) and readiness (e.g., modular design and 
human factors) can be accounted for in the early stages of design adequacy. System 
effectiveness quantification then becomes an iterative process, where operational 
feedback data is used to continually refine the quantification of the three key 
attributes. 
In his book, Habayeb has developed a detailed statistical proof of his 
equation, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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3.        The BALL Mode! 
a. The Equation 
Professor Robert E. Ball, a faculty member of the Naval Postgraduate 
School Aeronautics and Astronautics Department, in his book, The Fundamentals of 
Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design [Ref. 15], proposes a measure of 
combat effectiveness of an available aircraft in a particular scenario as the measure 
of mission success (MOMS), which is given by 
MOMS = MAM * S 
b. Definitions of Key Attributes 
(1) Mission Attainment Measure (MAM).   The mission 
attainment measure is the effectiveness (expressed as a range between 0 and 1) of 
the offensive capability of the aircraft. 
(2) Survivability (S). The effectiveness (also expressed as 
a range between 0 and 1) of the defense capability of the aircraft, where 
Ps=l-Pk 
where Ps = the probability of survival, and 
Pk = Ph*Pk/h 
Ph = the probability of hit (susceptibility) and 
Pk/h = the probability of kill given a hit (vulnerability) 
c. Analysis 
The MOMS equation was solely intended to provide a simple measure 
of effectiveness for system operational performance in a combat environment and the 
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impact that survivability has upon mission success. Professor Ball uses his MOMS 
formula to illustrate the tradeoffs between MAM and S. For example, in many 
combat situations the MAM is intentionally reduced in order to increase the S. In 
these situations, the more survivable aircraft can possibly have a smaller MOMS per 
aircraft. This translates into a tradeoff between quality (less capability per aircraft) 
and quantity (more survivable aircraft) to achieve the same overall level of mission 
success. 
4.        The OPNAVINST 3000.12 Model 
a. The Equation 
The OPNAVINST 3000.12, Operational Availability of Equipment and 
Weapons Systems [Ref. 16], provides the following equation which provides the three 
key system attributes, Operational Capability, Operational Availability, and 
Operational Dependability, as key to determining system effectiveness (SE): 
SE = Co * Ao * Do 
b. Definitions of Key Attributes 
(1) Operational Capability (Co). Refers to the system's 
operating characteristics (range, payload, accuracy, and the resultant ability to counter 
the threat, in terms of probability of kill, exchange ratios, etc. 
(2) Operational Availability (Ao). Probability that a system is 
ready to perform its specified function, in its specific operational environment, when 
called upon at a random point in time. 
(3) Operational Dependability (Do). Probability that the 
system, if up at the beginning of the mission, will remain up throughout the mission. 
Also referred to as "mission reliability". 
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c.        Analysis 
The OPNAVINST 3000.12 relies on a single-mission scenario and is 
intended to highlight the importance of operational availability as a critical element 
of system effectiveness. Other than offering the equation, the instruction goes no 
further in addressing the interrelationships of the three key attributes and only offers 
sub-elements for operational availability. Given Ao sub-elements are reliability, 
maintainability, and logistics resources. The OPNAVTNST does state that capability, 
availability, and dependability must be defined relative to the specific warfare 
environment and operating scenario envisioned or employed for a given system. 
5.        The MARSHALL Model 
a. The Equation 
John Marshall, retired Marine Corps colonel, and systems engineer in 
the Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) Project Office, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft 
Division (NAWCAD) in his ESP Proposal [Ref. 17], has proposed an equation based 
on those of Habayeb and Ball. Marshall combines the key system attributes, 
Operational Availability (Ao), Mission Reliability (Rm), Survivability (S), and 
Mission Attainment Measure (MAM), to develop a single measure of Effectiveness/ 
Suitability/ Performance (ESP) using the following equation for system effectiveness 
(SE): 
ESP = SE = Ao*Rm * S * MAM 
b. Definitions of Key Attributes 
(1)      Operational Availability  (Ao).      (includes   logistics 
readiness)  The probability that a system will be available for use when required. 
Given by equation: [Total up time / (total up and down time)] or [# of ready systems 
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/ total # systems]. Use Inherent Availability (A;) for unfielded systems. - readiness 
in terms of inherent design characteristics. Given by the equation: (MTBF) / 
(MTBF+MTTR). 
(2) Mission Reliability (Rm). The probability that a system 
will perform mission essential functions for a period of time under the conditions 
stated in the mission profile. Given by the equation: e(T/MTBOMF). 
(3) Survivability (S). The capability of a system to avoid or 
withstand man-made hostile environments without suffering an abortive impairment 
of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. Same as Ball's equation: (1- 
°h   Pk/h)- 
(4) Mission Attainment Measure (MAM). Mission effective- 
ness. Probability of performing the defined mission, given Ao, Rm, and S. This 
probability will be based on successive trials during applicable operational scenarios. 
Given by the equation (1 - error rate). 
c.        Analysis 
The ESP model relies on a single-mission scenario. According to 
Marshall, the model provides a common systems evaluation framework for DoD; a 
quantifiable, synergistic means to define and evaluate total system effectiveness. The 
model relies on a cyclical view of system performance and the key attributes that 
affect performance. The ESP model does not obviate the need for detailed analysis, 
but rather, it incorporates detailed analyses into a meaningful top-level equation to be 
used by decision makers. This model will be used as the basis for developing a 
system attribute hierarchy in the next chapter. 
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6.        The GIORDANO Model 
a. The Basic Equation 
Paul Giordano, Systems Effectiveness Branch Head of the U.S. Naval 
Applied Science Laboratory, in his 1966 report, Predicting Systems Effectiveness 
[Ref. 18], proposed the following system effectiveness (E) equation: 
E = Pc * Pt 
b. Definitions of Key Attributes 
(1) Performance Capability (PJ . Giordano does not 
specifically provide a definition. However, his usage of the term corresponds with 
the description of operational capability given in the OPNAVINST model. Thus, 
performance capability refers to the system's operating characteristics (range, payload, 
accuracy) and the resultant ability to counter the threat, in terms of probability of kill, 
exchange ratios, etc. 
(2) Time Dependency of Performance (P). Resource penalty 
parameters. Adds a time dimension to performance and allows all the "ilities" to be 
treated as modifiers of optimal performance. 
c. Analysis of Basic Equation 
Giordano's basic equation is designed for a single-mission scenario. 
According to Giordano, the program manager will build a system effectiveness model 
based on specific attribute requirements, based on factors related to mission 
accomplishment. The sequence of events is given below. 
First, the mission is reduced to tasks, which, if accomplished, will give 
the program manager confidence of mission success. The task descriptions form the 
basis for Effectiveness Analysis. Next, attribute requirements are established that 
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allow successful task accomplishment. The attribute values are varied according to 
task requirements. Acceptable levels of attribute values then become measures for 
detailed analytical modeling to assess sensitivities to resources, failures, logistics, 
degradation, and time demands. The interplay of simulation and analytical modeling 
is used to set up and evaluate systems and specific designs within systems. Giordano 
sees his equation as a means of treating all chosen attributes in a unified fashion and 
treating resource penalty-related attributes as an integral part of overall system 
performance. 
Giordano's envisions that the program manager should treat resource 
penalty attributes in three distinct ways. First, absolute limits, or "thresholds" are 
placed on some penalties, and treated as "go, no go" requirements. Second, the 
penalties are treated as design parameters and their impact is measured where possible 
as a change in the equation. Finally, the penalties are treated as quantitative attributes 
of a system in their own right and specific values are estimated. 
This leads Giordano into a discussion of combining attributes into an 
overall equation. If one can put a relative value on the attributes, they can be 
combined into a figure of merit or measure of effectiveness. However, Giordano 
warns against combining data beyond the point where it causes loss of information 
at the expense of simplicity. This is due to the variability built into the analysis. 
d.        The Multimission Equation 
Of all the multiplicative models, only Giordano discusses system 
effectiveness for multimission scenarios. Giordano expands his basic equation to 
portray a sample representation of system effectiveness for a large system in a 
multimission scenario as follows: 
E = W(Pc*Pt)/LT, W(Pc*Pt)/CA, W(Pc*Pt)/MP, W(Pc*Pt)/CO 
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where LT is Lead Time, CA is Acquisition Cost, MP is Manpower, CO is 
Ownership Cost, and W is a measure of mission worth. 
e.        Analysis of Multimission Equation 
The factors LT, CA, MP, and CO are examples of potential modifiers 
of the basic equation. The factor W is used to allow additional variation where multi- 
missions are treated independently or combined. W allows iterative analysis per 
mission. 
Note that one could translate Giordano's multi-mission equation into 
an additive equation, where the factor W can be used to separately weight single- 
mission measures, and then combine them into an overall measure of multimission 
system effectiveness. 
D.       THE ADDITIVE MODEL - ASDL 
1.        The Equation 
Dr. D. N. Mavris and Mr. D. DeLaurentis from the Aerospace Systems Design 
Labaratory at the School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 
in their paper entitled "An Integrated Approach to Military Aircraft Selection and 
Concept Evaluation" [Ref. 19], presented an equation identifying five key attributes, 
Affordability, Survivability, Readiness, Capability, and Safety, which combine into 
a single, overall measure of an aircraft system effectiveness, or overall evaluation 
criterion (OEC): 
OEC = a(/LCC/LCCBL) + b(MCI/MCIBL) + c(EAI/EAIBL) + d(Psurv/PslirvBL) + 
e(A/AiBL) 
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where a through e are importance coefficients which sum to 1, LCC is Life Cycle 
Cost, MCI is Mission Capability Index, EAI is Engine Related Attrition Index, Psurv 
is a measure of Survivability, and Aj is Inherent Availability. 
2. Definitions of Key Attributes 
a. Life Cycle Cost (LCC). A overall measurement of 
Affordability, or the total cost to the government for acquisition, ownership, 
operation, and disposal of the system over its life cycle. 
b. Mission Capability Index (MCI). A overall measurement of 
Capability, or the aircraft's ability to complete its mission (satisfy or exceed all 
mission requirements). 
c. Engine-Caused Attrition Index (EAI). A overall measurement 
of Safety, or an estimation of the effect on peacetime attrition of engine induced 
Class-A failures based on total number of aircraft operated. 
d. Probability of Survival (Psurv). An overall measurement of 
Survivability, or an aircraft's ability to evade detection and avoid damage which 
would result in loss of vehicle. 
e. Inherent Availability (Aj). An overall measurement of 
Readiness, or the degree to which an item is in operable and committal state at the 
start of the mission when the mission is called for, at an unknown time. 
3. Analysis 
The ASDL equation relies on a single-mission scenario and is used as follows. 
In comparing the effectiveness of competing systems, one picks a system, assigns a 
value of "1" to all the factors ofthat system, and then describes competing systems 
relative to the base system. For example, if the baseline system A has a .90 
survivability, then system B with a .45 survivability would be assigned a MOE for 
that factor of .5. Subsequently, a weighting coefficient is applied to survivability to 
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show how important it is to the customer. This is repeated for each attribute. 
Summation of the five weighted attributes into a top-level measure, as is shown in the 
ASDL equation, provides a comparison of an alternative system's overall effective- 
ness to the baseline system and is helpful in choosing between alternative systems. 
One problem with the ASDL equation is the subjectivity associated with 
assigning weighting coefficients. As the coefficients are basically measures of 
human preferences, the resultant OEC becomes a measure of preference, rather than 
effectiveness. Depending on one's preferences, choices between systems may 
change. However, the system itself, and its ability to accomplish the mission, may 
remain the same. In fact, if one has a predisposed preference for one system over all 
the others, one may be able to manipulate the coefficients until the equation shows the 
preferred system to be the most effective. Thus, the objectivity of this model may be 
quite low. 
E.       SINGLE VERSUS MULTIPLE MISSIONS 
For the most part, the above equations only provide a measurement of system 
effectiveness in accomplishing a specific mission in a given operational scenario. 
Furthermore, in order to use these equations, one must define mission 
accomplishment using a single number. The basic operational capability (or design 
adequacy, MAM, MCI) is then either degraded by other parameters, in the 
multiplicative equations, or weighted against other parameters, in the additive 
equation. Most systems today are built to accomplish multiple missions in multiple 
operational scenarios. Thus, using these equations, different numbers would have to 
be derived for each new mission and scenario, resulting in multiple measures of 
effectiveness. Giordano addresses the multimission scenario by suggesting a possible 
weighting of missions which would produce an overall system effectiveness number. 
The current DoDI 5000.2 warns against such weighting schemes: 
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Never use schemes in which several measures of effectiveness are 
weighted and combined into an overall score. Weighting schemes are 
sometimes helpful, but they must be clearly explained in the analysis 
so that their results can be interpreted correctly. [Ref. 6:p. 8-12] 
Thus, these equations may only be useful in providing a single-number of system 
effectiveness for a specific mission, and measuring overall system effectiveness 
would still depend on the subjective combination of several measures of effectiveness 
for multiple missions. 
F.       COMPARISON OF MODELS 
1.        The Multiplicative Models 
These models, with the exception of the aircraft-specific Ball model, are all 
purported to provide a standard means of measuring system effectiveness for any 
system. The Giordano model addresses system effectiveness in the simplest terms, 
combining performance capability (Pc) with only one other attribute (£), which 
signifies the numerous factors which can degrade performance over time. The 
Marshall model, on the other hand, provides the most complex approach, adding the 
Mission Attainment Measure (MAM) and Survivability (S) attributes from Ball's 
model to the availability (Ao) and reliability (Rm) attributes of the WSEIAC, 
Habayeb, and OPNAVINST models. Only the Giordano model includes a discussion 
of measuring system effectiveness beyond a mission-specific scenario. 
All of the multiplicative models present system effectiveness as some form of 
operational capability which is degraded over mission time. The multiplicative 
models use a cycle of mission accomplishment, which over time provides a measure 
of a system's effectiveness in accomplishing a particular mission. Each system 
attribute is probabilistic and through direct multiplication, combines equally with 
other attributes resulting in a measure of effectiveness between 0 and 1.   One 
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difficulty in using these models is the measurement of a system's operational 
capability as a number between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the relevance of multiplying 
the key system attribute measurements into a single-number measure of effectiveness 
is yet unproven. 
2. The Additive Models 
The ASDL model presents system effectiveness for an aircraft as the result of 
a variety of weighted attributes. Like some of the multiplicative models, this model 
includes availability, survivability, and a mission capability index (operational 
capability). Unlike the multiplicative models, however, the additive model also 
includes cost and safety as attributes which lead to system effectiveness. This model 
relies on assigning importance coefficients to each attribute, which then combine into 
an overall measure of effectiveness. The additive approach will not be discussed 
further in this thesis. 
3. A Modified Approach 
In the next chapter, the author will provide a more detailed discussion of the 
cycle of mission accomplishment and develop a system attribute hierarchy which may 
be useful in relating the numerous system attributes to key attributes and hence to 
system effectiveness. 
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VII. A SYSTEM ATTRIBUTE HIERARCHY 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
The current official guidance does not provide a hierarchy or tree for relating 
system measures of performance (attribute measures) to overall system effectiveness. 
Thus, there is no standard process by which the numerous attributes which make up 
a system are cohesively linked to system effectiveness. In the previous chapter, the 
author presented several models which link key system attributes to system 
effectiveness, resulting in a single-number measure of system effectiveness in 
accomplishing a particular mission. Although the relevance of combining the 
numerical values of system attributes into a single-number measure of system 
effectiveness is yet unproven, an understanding of the relationship between system 
attributes and system effectiveness is essential. Accordingly, the author will now 
present the beginning of a hierarchy or tree which relates many system attributes to 
four key attributes. Measures for each of the attributes are suggested. This new 
hierarchy will be closely related to the Marshall Model (see Chapter VI), where 
system effectiveness is defined as the result of a cycle of mission accomplishment 
(attributes). Any measure of system effectiveness in accomplishing a particular 
mission will most likely use these four key attributes. The hierarchy is proposed as 
a tool which might assist system engineers, analysts, and test and evaluation personnel 
in relating tradeoffs between the numerous system attributes to mission-level 
measures of effectiveness. 
B.       THE CYCLE OF MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT 
1.        The Key System Attributes 
Describing the combined effect of all attributes on overall system effectiveness 
(mission accomplishment) over the life of a system is quite cumbersome if stated in 
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terms of the separate effect of each attribute. A more useful hierarchy of attributes 
can be developed through an understanding of the cycle of mission accomplishment. 
Shown in Figure 7.1, this cycle identifies four overall key system attributes which 
describe overall system performance over time. For some systems, the cycle of 
mission accomplishment may occur only once. However, for most systems, the cycle 
may be repeated many times. Although the order of attribute occurrence may vary, 
the cycle usually begins with a system being available for use (Availability) on a 
given mission, continues with the system not breaking down during the mission due 
to malfunction (Reliability) or being killed or critically damaged by a threat 
(Survivability), and ends with some form of mission accomplishment (Capability). 
Availability Reliability Survivability Capability 
Figure 7.1. Cycle of Mission Accomplishment 
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2. The Key System Attributes Defined 
Use of this model necessitates the following definitions, and measurements, 
for the given key system attributes: 
a. Availability 
The availability of a fielded system, called Operational Availability, 
defined as the probability that a system will be available for use when required. 
Measurements can be either [Total up time / (total up and down time)] or [# of ready 
systems / total # systems]. For an unfielded system, called Inherent Availability, 
defined as readiness in terms of inherent design characteristics. Measurement is 
(Mean Time Between Failure) / (Mean Time Between Failure +Mean Time To 
Repair). 
b. Reliability 
The probability that a system will perform mission essential functions 
for a period of time under the conditions stated in the mission profile. Measurement 
js e(-T/MTBOMF) 
c. Survivability 
The capability of a system to avoid or withstand hostile environments 
without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish the designated 
mission. Measurement is Ps. 
d. Capability 
A measure of mission accomplishment (i.e., mission completion time, 
# of messages sent, # of enemy tanks killed) in a particular operational scenario. 
3. The Importance of Time 
The above model provides an overall description of key system attributes in 
terms of the cyclical employment of a system in its intended operational environment 
over time. The element of time is important, as most military missions are part of 
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larger operational scenarios which involve repeated system employment, at a planned 
utilization rate, over a specified time period. The cycle must be assessed over time, 
as a proper measure of overall system effectiveness must consider the time-related 
degradation in a system's ability to accomplish a mission. This holds true even for 
fire-and-forget systems such as missiles, where repeated firings are usually necessary 
in the overall accomplishment of a mission. 
C. A PROPOSED SYSTEM ATTRIBUTE HIERARCHY 
A system attribute hierarchy or tree can now be developed by expanding 
beyond the four key attributes of the cycle of mission accomplishment to include 
consideration of lower-level attributes. This hierarchy, shown in Figure 7.2, provides 
a method of relating tradeoffs between the numerous system attributes to overall 
system effectiveness. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Using the proposed cycle of mission accomplishment, a relationship between 
a system's numerous attributes and system effectiveness at the mission level is 
developed. This relationship is shown in the proposed system attribute hierarchy. 
The tree consists of four kev attributes, Availability, Reliability, Survivability, and 
Capability, which result in system effectiveness in accomplishing a particular mission. 
Although the relevance of combining the four key system attribute values into an 
single-number system effectiveness measurement is yet unproven, the hierarchy itself 
provides a useful tool for understanding and conducting tradeoffs between various 
system attributes in arriving at an optimal level of system effectiveness. 
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Figure 7.2. System Attribute Hierarchy 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the system acquisition process, the effectiveness and the cost of a system are 
the two key ingredients in determining system value to the military services. The 
effectiveness of a system is directly related to the characteristics or attributes ofthat 
system (e.g., speed, reliability, survivability). Success in system acquisition relies on 
(1) the early identification and successful incorporation of those system attributes that 
are critical to system effectiveness, and (2) the specification of numerical values for 
the system attributes (the system requirements) that maximizes system effectiveness 
at an acceptable cost. 
In this thesis, the relationship between the attributes, or characteristics, of a 
military weapon system and system effectiveness of that system was thoroughly 
examined. The current guidance mandates that system effectiveness be measured in 
terms of engagement or battle outcomes (at the battle level). To provide a basis for 
linking system attributes to system effectiveness, the author provided a wide spectrum 
of system acquisition-related documentation which supports an additional viewpoint 
to the current DoDI 5000.2 - that system effectiveness should also be measured in 
terms of mission outcomes (at the mission level). Furthermore, in the system 
development and test process, the mission level provides the best means for linking 
system attribute measurements to system effectiveness measurement. Accordingly, 
the author proposed new definitions for system effectiveness and measures of 
effectiveness which acknowledge that system effectiveness should be measured at 
both the mission and battle levels. 
The current DoDI 5000.2 guidance also does not provide a standard model for 
linking system attributes to system effectiveness. Thus, the author described several 
existing multiplicative and additive models which combine a few key system attribute 
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measurements into single-number measures of system effectiveness in accomplishing 
a particular mission. Finally, using a similar basis to the multiplicative models, the 
cycle of mission accomplishment, the author proposed a hierarchy or tree which 
relates many system attributes to the four key attributes, Availability, Reliability, 
Survivability, and Capability, and hence to system effectiveness in accomplishing a 
specified mission. Although the author acknowledged the need for a model relating 
system attributes to system effectiveness, the relevance of developing single-number 
measures of system effectiveness was left unproven. Ultimately, the goal of this 
thesis was to provide the reader with a better understanding of the relationship 
between system attributes and system effectiveness. 
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